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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the effects of organizational form on managerial behavior and 
firm performance, from an empirical perspective.  Managers of trusts are subject 
to stricter fiduciary responsibilities than managers of corporations.  This paper 
examines the ramifications empirically, by exploiting data generated by a change 
in British regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either 
a trust or a corporation.  I find evidence that trust law is effective in curtailing 
opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than 
their observationally equivalent corporate counterparts.  Trust managers also 
incur lower risk.  However, evidence suggests that trust managers tend to 
underperform their corporate counterparts, even after adjusting for the 
differences in risk.  These results show that the business flexibility granted by 
corporations leads to greater agency conflict and risk taking, but also to 
potentially superior risk-adjusted performance.  An investor who invests 
$100,000 in a trust, instead of an equivalent corporation, would save about $100 
per year in agency costs, but would forgo about $1,300 per year in gross risk-
adjusted performance.  The results have implications for corporate governance 
design, suggesting that heightened fiduciary duties can enhance investor 
protection by mitigating agency conflict and lessening managerial risk taking, but 
at the possible cost of inferior risk-adjusted performance.       
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ABSTRACT 
 
       
This paper studies the effects of organizational form on managerial behavior and 
firm performance, from an empirical perspective.  Managers of trusts are subject 
to stricter fiduciary responsibilities than managers of corporations.  This paper 
examines the ramifications empirically, by exploiting data generated by a change 
in British regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either 
a trust or a corporation.  I find evidence that trust law is effective in curtailing 
opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than 
their observationally equivalent corporate counterparts.  Trust managers also 
incur lower risk.  However, evidence suggests that trust managers tend to 
underperform their corporate counterparts, even after adjusting for the 
differences in risk.  These results show that the business flexibility granted by 
corporations leads to greater agency conflict and risk taking, but also to 
potentially superior risk-adjusted performance.  An investor who invests 
$100,000 in a trust, instead of an equivalent corporation, would save about $100 
per year in agency costs, but would forgo about $1,300 per year in gross risk-
adjusted performance.  The results have implications for corporate governance 
design, suggesting that heightened fiduciary duties can enhance investor 
protection by mitigating agency conflict and lessening managerial risk taking, but 
at the possible cost of inferior risk-adjusted performance.       
Trusts Versus Corporations: 
An Empirical Analysis of Competing Organizational Forms 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
We have witnessed the worst capital markets meltdown since the Great 
Depression.  One cause of the financial crisis was a cavalier attitude toward risk and 
responsibility that led to major mistakes in judgments by firm managers and, in some 
cases, to outright expropriation of investors.  The ensuing economic turmoil has led to a 
popular recommendation: expose firm insiders to greater fiduciary liability for their 
decisions.1   
This paper explores the ramifications of altering fiduciary standards by studying 
how two different business organizations, trusts and corporations, regulate their insiders, 
and the consequences.  Trust law imposes stricter fiduciary obligations on insiders than 
corporate law does.  Might insiders be less likely to misbehave in a trust as opposed to a 
corporation?  Does the difference in organizational form influence management’s 
performance or risk tolerance? By leaving less flexibility for management, strict fiduciary 
responsibilities can limit opportunistic behavior.  But that strictness can also constrain 
business decision making.  In other words, trusts and corporations strike different 
tradeoffs between agency conflict and flexibility in decision making.  This paper 
quantifies the effects on managerial behavior and firm performance of the different 
standards of conduct required by these two organizational forms.      
This paper exploits a variation generated by a change in British regulations in the 
1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either a trust or a corporation.  The 
parallel existence of alternative types of organizational forms within one industry 
provides the key design feature of this study.  The existence of the two types of funds 
offers a unique laboratory for the study of the effect of organizational form on agency 
conflict and firm performance.  This paper is among the first to take an empirical 
approach to the subject and, hence, it fills a crucial gap in the literature. 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Dominick T. Gattuso and Vernon R. Proctor, “Reining in Directors and Officers in Corporate 
America,” Business Law Today (Jan./Feb. 2010) at 46; and James K. Glassman and William T. Nolan, 
“Bankers Need More Skin in the Game,” Wall St. J. 
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This paper examines governance at a more fundamental level than does the 
existing literature.  A large literature in corporate law and finance studies the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms and investor protections on managerial behavior 
and firm performance.2  While there is a large empirical literature, most of that literature 
focuses on the corporation and, hence, takes organizational form as given.  One strand of 
that literature examines the impact on firm performance and firm value of the many 
governance devices and concessions corporations can make to investors, such as 
covenants, control rights, voting rules, board composition, and takeover defenses, within 
the corporation.3  However, these arrangements do not occur in an institutional vacuum, 
but rather within an environment of laws and regulations.  These laws and regulations 
may vary across organizational forms.  For instance, the fiduciary responsibilities 
imposed upon decision makers in corporations are not the same as those imposed upon 
decision makers in trusts.  Yet, the existing literature largely neglects study of non-
corporate organizations.  A second strand of literature examines differences in corporate 
governance structures across countries.4  Such research focuses on exploiting variation in 
governance environments across countries, but within the corporate form.  In contrast, 
this study exploits variation across organizational forms.  This approach offers sharper 
variation at a fundamental level of governance, and can help shed light on whether 
governance matters at all.   
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Jean Tirole, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE (Princeton University Press, 2006).  
3
 E.g., Audra Boone et al., The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical 
Analysis, 85 J. Fin. Econ. 66 (2007); N.K Chidambaran et al., Does Better Corporate Governance ‘Cause’ 
Better Firm Performance? (2006) (available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=891556); John E. Core et al., Does 
Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and 
Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. Fin. 655 (2006); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q. J. Econ 107 (2003); Charles P. Himmelberg et al., Understanding the Determinants of 
Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance, 53 J. Fin. Econ. 353 (1999); 
David Yermack, Higher Market Valuations of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. Fin. Econ. 
185 (1996); Randall Morck, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. 
Fin. Econ. 293 (1988); and Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: 
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (1985). 
4
 E.g., Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 430 (2008); Rafael 
La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin.1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law 
and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); Rafael LaPorta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. 
Fin. Econ. 3 (2000).  
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The traditional (Miller-Modigliani) view of corporate finance assigns 
organizational form no role.5  It is irrelevant in a frictionless environment.  But in a world 
with agency conflict, fiduciary duties are important and organizational form might have 
implications.  In business organizations, a crucial task is to minimize the agency costs 
that arise from separation of ownership and control.  In the corporation, ownership is 
vested in the shareholders and control is exercised by management.  Similarly, in the 
trust, ownership is vested in the beneficiaries and control is exercised by the trustee.  In 
the absence of complete information about managerial activities, owners/beneficiaries 
cannot design and enforce a contract specifying the managerial actions to be taken in 
each state of the world.  Fiduciary duties provide a set of standards which the law applies 
to restrain insiders from exercising their discretionary power in contingencies not 
specifically foreseeable and over which the parties could not contract.  Corporate law 
resolves agency conflict by imposing on corporate officers and directors a duty of loyalty 
in pursuit of the corporation’s objectives and a duty of care in performance.  Trust law, 
likewise, resolves the conflict between beneficiaries and trustees by imposing on the 
trustee a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.   
While similar, the fiduciary duties supplied by trust law and corporate law are not 
the same.  The duty of loyalty and the duty of care under trust law are stricter than those 
under corporate law.6  For instance, under both corporate law and trust law, the duty of 
care requires that decision makers discharge their duties with such care and skill as a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise.  However, the courts, understanding that 
excessive liability can deter economically desirable business activity, apply the duty of 
care in a way that defers to officers and directors of corporations.  That deference is 
embodied in the business judgment rule, which presumes that, in making business 
                                                 
5
 F. Modigliani and M. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 
Amer. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958). 
6
 Note that trust fiduciary duties are default rules which the parties can vary by mutual consent.  However, 
some (e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 Geo. 
L.J. 67 (2005)) object to the characterization of trust’s fiduciary rules as true default rules, and Professors 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff demonstrate empirically that changes in trust fiduciary laws impact the behavior 
of trustees of non-commercial trusts.  Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent 
Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. L. & Econ. 681 (2007).  Also note that, 
while U.S. business trust statutes could have invoked different fiduciary duties, most such statutes instead 
incorporate the strict fiduciary standards of the common law of trusts. 
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decisions, corporate officers and directors complied with the duty of care.  The business 
judgment rule places on a plaintiff challenging a business decision within a corporation 
the burden of rebutting the presumption, as the rule recognizes that reasonable decisions 
can sometimes result in unfavorable outcomes.7  In contrast, trust law applies no business 
judgment rule in reviewing managerial actions, even when trusts are used in a 
commercial context.  In effect, the burden is placed upon trust management to show that 
their business decisions were prudent despite the unfavorable outcome.8  The end result is 
that it is easier to hold decision makers personally accountable for their business 
decisions in trusts than in corporations.  The other fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, 
requires that decision makers act without any conflict of interest.  However, corporate 
law interprets the duty loosely, so as to permit conflict of interest transactions so long as 
they are “fair” to the corporation.  In contrast, trust law prohibits all such transactions, 
even if they would benefit the trust.  In short, due to the different fiduciary standards, 
decision makers are exposed to greater personal liability in trusts than in corporations.  
Tight fiduciary duties might impact a lot within a business organization.  They might 
lower agency conflict and reduce opportunistic behavior by insiders, but by leaving less 
flexibility for management, they might also impact performance and risk taking.   
                                                 
7
 The English courts have not in terms developed a business judgment rule in the way that U.S. state courts 
have done, but “the same function is performed, perhaps more effectively, by formulating the directors’ 
duties subjectively.” Paul L. Davies, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Individual Shareholders, in 
Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1992) at 85n6.  The 
classic statement is that directors “exercise their discretion bona fide in what they may consider - not what 
a court may consider - in the interests of the company.” Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 (CA) at 
306, cited in Davies at 85. In other words, while there is no express business judgment rule, English courts 
are reluctant to second guess corporate decisions and have refrained from holding directors liable for mere 
errors of judgment. 
8
 While the corporate duty of care, along with the business judgment rule, require deference to ordinary 
business decisions absent gross negligence or conflict of interest, the trust duty of care is set at the more 
restrictive “reasonable person” standard.  The general principle followed by English courts since 1883 is 
stated: “As a general rule, a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes, in managing trust affairs, all 
those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his 
own.” Speight v. Gaunt [1883] 9 App. Cas. 1 at 19 cited in John Mowbray et al., Lewin on Trusts (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000) at 842.  The standard requires trustees to take “objectively reasonable care in the context of 
the particular trusteeship, including due professional care where appropriate.” Joshua Getzler, Duty of 
Care, in Breach of Trust (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., Hart Publishing 2002) at 42.  This standard has 
been reflected in the Trust Act 2000, which supplies a high objective standard, measuring trustee conduct 
against the conduct to be expected of a reasonable person with the trustee’s knowledge, skills and 
characteristics.  Getzler at 42.  Further, the Trust Act imposes an even higher standard of care on trustees 
who are professionals or who hold themselves out as having special skill.  Trust Act 2000 Sec. 1(1).  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is some authority for deferential review of trustee decision making.  
See Restatement (Third) of Trusts 87.  
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This paper examines mutual funds in the United Kingdom, where funds can 
organize in either corporate or trust form.  The paper identifies, empirically, costs and 
benefits associated with these competing organizational forms.  The results suggest that 
trusts are more effective than corporations in curtailing opportunistic behavior by 
managers.  Managers of trusts charge significantly lower fees than their corporate 
counterparts, even after controlling for potential differences in managerial ability and job 
complexity.  I confirm that these results are driven by differences in organizational form 
and not by self-selection.  I employ both matched samples analysis and sample selection 
models to reach this conclusion.  One technique addresses selection on observables and 
the other selection on unobservables.  Both techniques support the conclusion that the 
difference in fees is a treatment effect of organizational form, not a selection bias.  The 
results suggest that trust law’s strict fiduciary duties are a superior mechanism for 
mitigating managerial opportunism and agency conflict within business organizations.  
While strict fiduciary responsibilities limit opportunistic behavior, they might also 
constrain managerial flexibility in business decision making.  Indeed, I find that trusts 
exhibit greater risk aversion than corporations.  Evidence also suggests that trusts 
generate lower returns than corporations, even after adjusting for the difference in risk.   
In an equilibrium context, the trust’s underperformance would more than offset its 
agency cost savings.  A hypothetical investor with $100,000 to invest would save, on 
average, about $100 per year in management fees by investing in a trust instead of an 
equivalent corporation.  But on average, that investor would earn about $1,300 per year 
less in gross risk-adjusted returns.  On a net basis, the investor is worse off having 
invested in a trust instead of an equivalent corporation.  The business flexibility granted 
to the corporate funds leads to greater risk-taking behavior and agency costs, but also 
sufficiently superior risk-adjusted performance to more than compensate for those costs.  
The results have implications for corporate governance design, suggesting that 
heightened fiduciary duties can enhance investor protection by mitigating agency conflict 
and reducing managerial risk taking, but at the potential cost of inferior risk-adjusted 
performance.     
One caveat is that, due to data limitations, the risk-adjusted performance tests do 
not have sufficient power to conclusively establish the statistical significance of certain 
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results.  In spite of that limitation of the time series, the evidence does indicate that the 
difference in performance is quite sizeable in economic terms. 
The next section of the paper describes the change in the British mutual fund 
industry that generated a unique laboratory for the study of the effect of organizational 
form.  Section III discusses related literature, and Section IV describes the data.  Section 
V presents the results with respect to fund expenses.  Section VI presents the results with 
respect to fund performance.  Section VII addresses endogeneity concerns.  Section VIII 
assesses the overall results and concludes. 
 
II. The British Mutual Fund Industry 
 
The mutual fund industry is a useful setting for analyzing the extent to which 
organizational form impacts managerial behavior and firm performance.  With mutual 
funds, it is easy to measure and compare the fund’s performance, as net asset values are 
computed daily.  Moreover, so long as they satisfy income distribution requirements, 
mutual funds receive flow-through tax treatment, regardless of organizational form.  
Thus, there are no differential tax effects.  Furthermore, by focusing on one industry, we 
minimize the concern that results are driven by differences in operating characteristics of 
firms rather than by differences in governance.  Finally, the fees charged to fund 
investors are computed regularly and on a standardized basis, and can be used to measure 
agency costs.  The mutual fund literature interprets management fees as a measure of 
agency conflict between fund managers and investors.9  Investors want to maximize their 
expected returns, net of fees, while fund managers want to maximize their own profits.  
Since studies find that management fees are not positively related to performance,10 
higher fees benefit fund managers while reducing net returns for fund investors.  Because 
the parties’ incentives differ and managerial actions are not fully observable by investors, 
                                                 
9
 E.g., Diane Guercio et al., Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End Investment Companies, 69 
J. Fin. Econ. 111 (2003); Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. 
Mutual Fund Industry, 46 J. Fin. Econ. 321 (1997); Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison, Risk Taking by 
Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives, 105 J. Pol. Econ. 1167 (1997).  
10
 E.g., Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund 
Industry, 46 J. Fin. Econ. 321 (1997); Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 57 J. 
Fin. 57 (1997) Martin Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 51 J. Fin. 
783  (1996).  
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the levying of management fees on fund investors is a classic example of an agency 
conflict.  In sum, mutual funds provide outcomes that are directly observable and 
measurable, and that reflect the agency conflict between investors and managers.   
This study focuses on mutual funds in the United Kingdom.  Prior to 1997, British 
open-end mutual funds were organized exclusively as trusts, not corporations.  These 
British mutual funds are called “unit trusts.”  Unit trusts are created under British trust 
law and have been in existence for over a century.11  Mutual funds in the U.K. evolved as 
unit trusts under trust law, as opposed to corporations under English company law, in 
order to avoid certain restrictions of English company law, which does not apply to 
trusts.12  In a unit trust, the fund manager establishes the trust by entering into a trust 
agreement with a trustee.  Investors purchase beneficial interests in the trust pursuant to a 
contract between the investors and the manager.  The trustee takes ownership of the 
investment pool on behalf of investors, and the manager manages it. The contract 
pursuant to which the investors purchased their beneficial interests incorporates the terms 
of the trust agreement, which is binding upon and enforceable by the investors.  The 
rights and remedies of the investors are thus governed by trust (and contract) law.   
A major change to the British mutual fund market occurred in 1997.  In 1997, 
British regulators permitted a new kind of open-end mutual fund, the Open-Ended 
Investment Company (OEIC).  OEICs are corporations organized under The Open-Ended 
Investment Companies (Investment Companies with Variable Capital) Regulations 1996, 
which came into effect on January 6, 1997.  As corporations, OEICs are independent 
legal entities with a board of directors, managed by a manager appointed by the fund’s 
board.13  Investors invest in an OEIC by purchasing shares in the fund.14    
                                                 
11
 Kam Fan Sin, The Legal Nature of the Unit Trust (Oxford University Press, 1997) at 23. 
12
 English company law prevented companies from repurchasing their own shares.  Thus, under English 
company law, mutual fund investors would not be able to liquidate their investments by demanding that the 
fund repurchase their shares; they would only be able to liquidate by selling the shares in a secondary 
market.  However, since trusts are not subject to company law, nothing prohibited unit trusts from 
repurchasing investors’ interests.  This flexibility accounts for the development of open-end mutual funds 
as unit trusts rather than as corporations. Sin, at 42-43.  That open-end funds organize as trusts 
subsequently became a requirement codified in the regulations.   
13
 INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF UNITED 
KINGDOM AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 15 (2005).   
14
 The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Section 46(1); and The Open-Ended 
Investment Companies Regulations 1996, Section 40(1). 
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The governance apparatus of OEICs, in practice, does not differ much from that 
of unit trusts.    While OEICs have a board of directors and the trusts do not, that 
difference is not substantive.  OEIC directors are not required to be independent.15  
Moreover, no minimum number of directors is specified for OEIC boards.16  The only 
requirement of the OEIC board is that the fund’s manager must serve as a director.17  In 
practice, therefore, virtually all OEIC boards consist solely of the fund’s manager.18  In 
other words, the board of an OEIC is not an active monitor comprised of independent 
directors, as the board is in the U.S. fund industry.  They exist merely on paper.   
In a British fund organized in trust form, the trustee performs essentially a 
custodial role.19  The equivalent custodial role is performed in an OEIC by the 
“depository.”20  Both the trustee and the depository must be independent entities and are 
responsible for the safe keeping of investor assets.21  The trustee and the depository are 
also responsible for overseeing fund activities and protecting investor interests.22  
                                                 
15
 John Gapper, “Open End Funds May Face Tight Controls,” Financial Times (May 3, 1995) at 11.  
Instead, U.K. authorities have looked to an independent depository for protection of shareholder interests. 
INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF UNITED KINGDOM 
AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 21-22 (2005) [hereinafter REVIEW OF U.K. 
GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS]; The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, 
Section 15(8)(f); and The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 1996, Section 10(8)(f). 
16
 The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Section 15(4); The Open-Ended Investment 
Companies Regulations 1996, Section 10(4); and U.K. Financial Services Authority, Collective Investment 
Scheme Sourcebook (2001) 7.1.4(1)(a). 
17
 HM TREASURY, Open-Ended Investment Companies, 1999, at 3-4. 
18
 INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF UNITED 
KINGDOM AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES Sec. 6.5 (2005); The Open-Ended 
Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Section 34(4); The Open-Ended Investment Companies 
Regulations 1996, Section 28(4); U.K. Securities and Investments Board, Open Ended Investment 
Companies Consultative Paper 93, 8 (1995); and FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST YEARBOOK 1996, 
at 53 (1996) (stating “the role [of the director] will be virtually the same as is currently performed by a unit 
trust management company”). 
19
 INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF UNITED 
KINGDOM AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 18 (2005). 
20
  INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF UNITED 
KINGDOM AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 15 (2005); HM TREASURY, 
OEICS MADE EASY, 1999, at 6; FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST & OEICS YEARBOOK 1997, at 
A14 (1999); FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST & OEICS YEARBOOK 1998, at A38 (2000). 
21
 The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Sections 5, 15(8)(f); and The Open-Ended 
Investment Companies Regulations 1996, Sections 5, 10(8)(f); Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
Section 243(4); U.K. Financial Services Authority, Collective Investment Scheme Sourcebook (2001) 
Sections 7.4 and 7.9.4. 
22
 U.K. Financial Services Authority, Collective Investment Scheme Sourcebook (2001) Sections 7.4, 
7.7.1(3), 7.9.1, INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF 
UNITED KINGDOM AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 16 (2005); 
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The primary reason for the U.K.’s adoption of the OEIC was marketability.  The 
OEICs were to be marketable in the European Union, unlike the unit trusts.23  In the 
1980s, the European Union set forth a framework for promoting cross-border flow of 
mutual funds among its members. Known as the UCITS Directive,24 this framework 
imposed minimum standards regulating open-end mutual funds within the European 
Union. The UCITS Directive set forth minimum standards with respect to fund 
organizational form, diversification, authorization, permissible activities, and disclosure, 
allowing mutual funds organized under the laws of one member nation to comply with 
only the marketing, advertising, and tax laws of another nation in which they do business. 
In other words, the Directive allowed mutual funds to operate under a “passport” system, 
where they could be offered for sale throughout Europe once they were authorized in one 
member state, and so long as they met the minimum standards set forth in the Directive.  
The Directive adopted the corporation as the required organizational form.  Thus, unlike 
unit trusts, which did not initially meet the requirements of the Directive in terms of 
organizational form, OEICs could be sold throughout Europe.  Moreover, the law of 
trusts, which governs unit trusts, grew out of English common law and is peculiar to that 
heritage.25  While trusts are common to those parts of the world with a strong British 
heritage, they are a foreign concept in European continental countries, where the 
Napoleonic and Roman legal heritage dominates.26  Thus, European investors were not 
likely to be familiar with the technical legal structure of unit trusts.27  OEICs, therefore, 
were anticipated to be more marketable outside the United Kingdom.28  Note, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST & OEICS YEARBOOK 1997 at A6 (1999); and U.K. Securities and 
Investments Board, Open Ended Investment Companies Consultative Paper 93, 13 [3.10] (1995). 
23
 HM TREASURY, Open-Ended Investment Companies, 1999, at 1; and U.K. Securities and Investments 
Board, Open Ended Investment Companies Consultative Paper 93, 7 (1995).  Besides cross-border 
marketability, a second difference is that, unlike unit trusts, OEICs can organize in umbrella form, with 
multiple sub-funds.  HM TREASURY, Open-Ended Investment Companies, 1999, at 4; and U.K. 
Securities and Investments Board, Open Ended Investment Companies Consultative Paper 93, 7-8 (1995).   
24
 Formally, Council Directive 85/611/EEC of December 20, 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations, 
and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS Directive). Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, 4 (EC). 
25
 FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST & OEICS YEARBOOK 1998, at A9 (2000). 
26
 FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST & OEICS YEARBOOK 1998, at A9 (2000). 
27
 FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST & OEICS YEARBOOK 1998, at A9 (2000). 
28
 OEICs, however, were unsuccessful in penetrating European markets during the initial time period 
(1997-2001) analyzed in this paper.  OEICs lacked the tax advantages of funds organized offshore. Jean 
Eaglesham, “New Type of Fund Poised for Launch,” Financial Times (Apr. 28, 1997) at 10.  Moreover, 
OEIC sponsors lacked the distribution channels (sales forces) and culture needed to sell funds on the 
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that OEICs did not displace unit trusts within the U.K.  Rather, since 1997, investment 
advisors have been allowed to organize and market both forms of mutual funds (the 
OEIC and the unit trust) in the U.K.  Thus, the change in law has produced a useful set of 
data for assessing the impact of different organizational forms.   
In the U.K., regulatory authority over unit trusts is delegated to the Financial 
Services Authority (the FSA) and regulatory authority over OEICs is delegated to the 
Treasury.29  However, both authorities have adopted a common set of rules and guidance 
(the FSA’s “Sourcebook”) related to the operation of funds and the activities of their 
managers.30  Thus, the regulatory regime governing unit trusts and OEICs is essentially 
the same,31 with a notable exception.  With respect to governance, unit trusts are subject 
to trust law while OEICs are subject to corporate law.32   
First, the regulations are clear that unit trusts are governed by trust law.  The 
Sourcebook defines a unit trust as “a collective investment scheme under which the 
                                                                                                                                                 
continent.  FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST YEARBOOK 1996, at 54 (1996) (stating “only a small 
number of U.K. investment groups have distribution capability in Europe.”); Jean Eaglesham, “First Steps 
toward a Pan-European Fund Industry?” Financial Times (Jan. 28, 1999) at 33.  In addition, the Directive 
initially only permitted cross-border sales of funds that invest in “transferrable” securities.  This restriction 
excluded many types of OEICs from the passport system, including real estate funds, commodities funds, 
and funds of funds.   Finally, many fund sponsors were preoccupied with the more immediate challenges of 
Year 2000 compliance and European monetary union.  Jean Eaglesham, “First Steps toward a Pan-
European Fund Industry?” Financial Times (Jan. 28, 1999) at 33;  FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST 
YEARBOOK 1996, at 54 (1996) (emphasizing the need for administrative and technological capabilities).  
For these reasons, analyzing data from the 1997-2001 time period is convenient, as both types of funds 
were essentially selling only within the U.K. 
29
 See, respectively, Sections 247(1) and 262(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, ch. 8. 
30
 The Sourcebook (1.1.8) states that “together, this material forms a major part of the product regulation 
regime for ICVCs [Investment Companies with Variable Capital, also known as Open-Ended Investment 
Companies] and AUTs [Authorized Unit Trusts], complementing material in the ICVC regulations [The 
Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, replacing The Open-Ended Investment Companies 
Regulations 1996, both issued by the Treasury] and Chapter III of Part XVII of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (for authorized unit trust schemes).” U.K. Financial Services Authority, Collective 
Investment Scheme Sourcebook (2001). 
31
 U.K. Securities and Investments Board, Open Ended Investment Companies Consultative Paper 93, 11 
[sec. 1.7] (1995) (stating that OEIC regulations track unit trust regulations and “where practicable use 
similar language.  This is to enable regulatory concepts and procedures which are already familiar … to 
operate in a similar manner for open-ended investment companies”); INV. MGMT. ASS’N, REVIEW OF 
THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF UNITED KINGDOM AUTHORIZED COLLECTIVE 
INVESTMENT SCHEMES 18 (2005) (stating that “the governance and regulatory principles applicable to 
[unit trusts] have also been applied to the OEIC”); FINANCIAL TIMES, UNIT TRUST YEARBOOK 
1996, at 54 (1996) (stating that “levels of investor protection between a U.K. OEIC and a unit trust are very 
similar”).  
32
 See U.K. Securities and Investments Board, Open Ended Investment Companies Consultative Paper 93, 7 
(1995). 
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property is held in trust for the participants by the trustee.”33  In addition, the Sourcebook 
states that, with respect to unit trusts, “both the manager and the trustee have fiduciary 
duties under the general law relating to trusts.”34  The Sourcebook reiterates that: 
The duties of the manager and the trustee imposed upon them by 
the rules in this sourcebook and by the trust deed are in addition to, 
and not in derogation from, the duties which are otherwise 
imposed upon them by law.  The manager and the trustee are 
required to fulfill those other duties by this rule.35  
In contrast, OEICs are governed by corporate law.  The regulations are clear that the 
“provisions of the Companies Act will apply to [OEICs] as if they are incorporated 
bodies.”36  The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations, which are issued by the 
Treasury and govern OEICs exclusively, state that OEIC directors are subject to fiduciary 
duties that are “enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a 
company by its directors.”37  The Regulations further state that the court may relieve any 
officer of an OEIC from liability if he or she “acted honestly and reasonably”38, a lower 
standard than the “objectively prudent” standard applied to trustees under trust law.39   
In sum, while much of the regulatory apparatus applicable to unit trusts and 
OEICs is the same, the fiduciary laws differ, depending upon the fund’s organizational 
form.  That is, the main palpable difference between unit trusts and OEICs is the 
difference in fiduciary laws.  Neither trusts nor OEICs are overseen by an active monitor, 
and both are taxed and regulated similarly, making the difference in fiduciary laws the 
prime difference.  In other words, the British mutual fund market contains two parallel 
organizations essentially identical in almost every respect except for the fiduciary laws 
that are applied to the fund managers.  This difference in fiduciary standards is a 
fundamental distinction between trusts and corporations.   
                                                 
33
 Sourcebook at 1.1.6.  The Sourcebook also requires that this language appear in the trust’s trust deed.  
Sourcebook at 2.2.6(7)(a). 
34
 Sourcebook at 7.7.1. 
35
 Sourcebook at 7.10.1(1), (2). 
36
 U.K. Financial Services Authority, The FSA’s Responsibilities Under the OEIC Regulations: The 
Collective Investment Scheme Information Guide 4.1.6(1) (2004). 
37
 The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Section 35(2). 
38
 The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Section 63(2) and The Open-Ended 
Investment Companies Regulations 1996, Section 57(2). 
39
 See supra note 8. 
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And it is a distinction with teeth.  Although public corporations in the U.K. face 
few lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty,40 it takes only one suit to get the attention 
of officers and directors.  Moreover, trusts have a long history of such suits, including in 
the fund context.41  In one instance, for example, Baring Asset Management (BAM) was 
required to account for losses in connection with its management of a fund that was 
organized as a trust.  The fund managed by BAM lost $32 million over the 2000-2001 
period, considerably underperforming its benchmark over that time.  The court stated that 
the facts constitute “a breach of duty” and “a credible case against BAM for damages for 
professional negligence.”42  In the fund context, fiduciary laws are litigated and enforced 
in the courts.  In addition, the supervisory authorities may also act on behalf of 
investors.43 
 
III.  Related Literature 
 
While the empirical finance literature has not focused on the competition between 
the corporation and alternative organizational forms,44 the law literature has given it 
recent attention, from a theoretical perspective.45  The literature notes that, on the one 
                                                 
40
 See Armour, John, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins and Richard Nolan. 2009. “Private Enforcement of 
Corporate Law:  A Comparative Empirical Analysis of the UK and the US,” 6 Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies (forthcoming). 
41
 See, generally, Kam Fan Sin, The Legal Nature of the Unit Trust (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
42
 Steamship Mutual Underwriting Assn. Trustees (Bermuda Ltd.) and others v. Baring Asset Management 
Ltd. [2004] EWHC 202, Q.B. 
43
 To protect the interests of investors, the applicable supervisory authority may take enforcement actions 
against the managers, including issuing orders (The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, 
Section 25(1)(c); The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 1996, Section 18(1)(b); and 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Section 257(1)(d)) and initiating investigations (The Open-Ended 
Investment Companies Regulations 2001, Section 30(1); The Open-Ended Investment Companies 
Regulations 1996, Section 22(1); and Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Section 284). 
44
 See discussion accompanying supra notes 2 through 4. 
45
 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as ‘Uncorporation’: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 31 (2005); 
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621 (2004); Robert H. Sitkoff, 
Trust Law, Corporate Law and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. 565 (2003); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 
321 (2003); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 
58 The Business Lawyer 559 (2003);  Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434 (1998); John H. Langbein, Why Did 
Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1069 (2007); John H. Langbein, 
Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 Yale L.J. 929 (2005); John 
H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165 
(1997);  Leslie, Melanie B. 2005. “Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules,” 94 
Georgetown Law Journal 67-119. 
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hand, the stricter fiduciary duties of trust law might lead to overdeterrence of trust 
management, while on the other hand, those same strict fiduciary duties might leave less 
discretion for trust management and, hence, lower the potential for agency conflict.  The 
literature is unable to reach a conclusion about whether, on a net basis, trust law 
maximizes investor welfare relative to the corporation.  For example, Professor Schwarcz 
states that “there are not … clear answers to the fundamental question of whether trusts 
are a better form of business organization than corporations.”46  As a result, the 
scholarship contains explicit calls for empirical work on the subject.  For instance, Sitkoff 
(2005), in outlining a research agenda for future study of the trust, states that “a third line 
of suggested inquiry is empirical…. Data should facilitate basic comparative study of the 
statutory business trust and other forms of business association.”47  This paper seeks to 
fill that crucial gap in the literature by undertaking such a comparative treatment of the 
commercial trust and the corporation from an empirical perspective.   
This study’s hypothesis is that the different fiduciary obligations applicable to 
mutual funds organized as trusts (unit trusts) and as corporations (OEICs) matter with 
respect to agency and performance.  This contrasts with empirical studies in the finance 
literature on the British mutual fund market, which ignore the difference between these 
two types of funds.  For instance, studies examine abnormal returns and persistence in 
British mutual funds,48 management fees and performance of British and European 
funds,49 tournaments in the British fund industry,50 and ethical mutual funds in the U.K.51  
But these studies all neglect the fact that, since 1997, some mutual funds are organized as 
corporations and others as trusts, and are thus subject to different fiduciary standards.  
While most studies do not acknowledge that two forms of open-end funds exist in the 
                                                 
46
 Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 The 
Business Lawyer 559 at __ (2003). 
47
 Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as ‘Uncorporation’: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 31 at __ (2005). 
48
 Roger Otten & Dennis Bams, European Mutual Fund Performance, 8 European Fin. Management 75 
(2002); Garrett Quigley & Rex A. Sinquefield, Performance of UK Equity Unit Trusts, 1 J. Asset 
Management 72 (2000); and M. Rhodes, Past Imperfect? The Performance of UK Equity Managed Funds, 
9 FSA Occasional Paper 1 (2000).  
49
 Roger Otten & Mark Schweitzer, A Comparison Between the European and the U.S. Mutual Fund 
Industry (Working Paper Series, 2001), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=164108. 
50
 Rob Jans & Roger Otten, Tournaments in the UK Mutual Fund Industry (Maastricht University, Working 
Paper, 2005).  
51
 Rob Bauer et al., International Evidence on Ethical Mutual Fund Performance and Investment Style, 29 
J. Banking & Fin. 1751 (2005).  
 - 14 - 
U.K., those that do acknowledge the two forms proceed to treat them as the same.  For 
instance, Professors Keswani and Stolin, in examining whether the “smart money effect” 
exists in the U.K., acknowledge that OEICs entered the market in the 1990s, but they 
assume that “differences between unit trusts and OEICs are unimportant and [they] refer 
to both types of funds as mutual funds.”52  In contrast to those studies, this paper analyzes 
the impact of the difference in organizational form.  The only other study to examine 
structural differences between OEICs and unit trusts is my earlier paper.53  That paper 
finds that mutual fund organizational form has a statistically significant impact on 
management fees and loads.  The empirical analysis in that paper, however, is conducted 
on a limited data set, consisting of a cross-section and allowing for limited control 
variables.  This paper exploits a richer set of data, allowing for such factors as time-
varying effects and family-level characteristics in the regression models.  The different 
model specifications yield different results.54   
Although mutual funds are organized in a variety of forms around the world, 
studies have not focused on such differences.  The few comparative studies that exist 
explore differences in mutual funds at the industry or national levels only; none highlight 
differences in mutual fund organizational form.  One comparative study, by Professors 
Khorana, Servaes and Tufano, examines 56 countries in an attempt to identify those 
factors that determine the size of national mutual fund industries.55  The authors find that 
strong legal and regulatory factors, such as disclosure laws, positively impact the size of 
mutual fund industries.  The study, however, does not consider differences in mutual fund 
organizational form as one of those factors.  Similarly, Klapper, Sulla and Vittas examine 
growth patterns of mutual fund industries around the world and the determinants of 
mutual fund development.56  Analyzing data on 40 countries, the authors find that mutual 
funds are more advanced in countries with better developed capital markets and market-
                                                 
52
 Aneel Keswani & David Stolin, Which Money is Smart? Mutual Fund Buys and Sells of Individual and 
Institutional Investors, 63 J. Fin. 85 at __ (2008). 
53
 A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal & Econometric Analysis, 33 J. 
Corp. L. 745 (2008).  
54
 See discussion accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
55
 Ajay Khorana et al., Explaining the Size of the Mutual Fund Industry Around the World, 78 J. Fin.Econ. 
145 (2005).  
56
 Leora Klapper et al., The Development of Mutual Funds Around the World, 5  Emerging Markets Review 
(2004). 
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based financial systems.  They do not, however, consider differences in mutual fund 
organizational form.  Along the same lines, Khorana, Servaes and Tufano study factors 
that determine national differences in fund fee levels.57  Taking a cross-sectional 
approach, they examine differences at the fund, complex and national level.  While their 
study is comparative, and includes fund-level data, their analysis does not account 
explicitly for differences in fund organizational form.  In fact, none of the above studies 
discuss the fact that open-end funds around the world are organized in corporate and non-
corporate forms.  Unlike those studies, this paper focuses on heterogeneity in 
organizational form. 
While there has been much empirical research on mutual fund governance in the 
U.S., that research takes organizational form as fixed.  The reason is not surprising.  
While U.S. law (the Investment Company Act of 1940) does not expressly require that 
mutual funds be organized as corporations, it does impose the corporate paraphernalia of 
boards of directors and shareholder voting rights on all mutual funds, whether organized 
as a corporation or in some other form, such as a business trust, a limited partnership, or 
simply a pool of investment funds.  It also imposes the same fiduciary standards upon 
directors regardless of the fund’s formal organizational form.58  Hence, studies on U.S. 
mutual funds, taking the corporate paradigm as a given, have examined how board 
structure and board composition, but not fiduciary standards, impact fund expenses.  For 
instance, Tufano and Sevick find that expenses are lower in funds governed by smaller 
boards, and by boards containing a greater percentage of independent directors.59  Del 
Guercio, Dann and Partch find that expenses are lower in funds with more independent 
directors and in funds with more independent directors serving since fund inception.60  In 
addition to expenses, studies have examined how board structure and composition impact 
the likelihood that a board will act in the interests of mutual fund investors generally.  For 
example, Del Guercio, Dann and Partch find that fund boards are more likely to act in 
                                                 
57
 Ajay Khorana et al., Mutual Fund Fees Around the World (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 
Series, 2006).  
58
 See Sheldon A. Jones., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 421, 434-39 (1988).  
59
 Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 46 
J. Fin. Econ. 321 (1997).  
60
 Diane Guercio et al., Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End Investment Companies, 69 J. 
Fin. Econ. 111 (2003).  
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investors’ interests the greater the proportion of independent directors on the board.  They 
also find that fund boards are more likely to act in investors’ interests when all directors 
are elected annually.  In a similar manner, Khorana, Tufano and Wedge examine how 
board structure and composition impact the likelihood of the board acting in the interests 
of investors in the specific context of mutual fund mergers.61  They find that boards of 
underperforming funds are more likely to approve mergers the greater the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and the lower the compensation of directors.  Other 
studies have approached mutual fund structure from a different angle.  For instance, 
Kong and Tang analyze factors that determine board structures.62  Ferris and Yan study 
the ownership structure (public or private) of the fund’s management company.63  Ferris 
and Yan find that, after controlling for board governance variables and other fund 
characteristics, funds managed by publicly-traded management companies suffer from 
greater agency costs than those managed by private companies.  While Ferris and Yan 
find evidence that agency costs vary across two categories of funds, their focus is on the 
ownership structure of the management company, not the organizational form of the 
fund. 
That is, despite this volume of work analyzing U.S. mutual funds, no studies 
examine the more antecedent and fundamental question of whether investors are better 
served by mutual funds organized in corporate versus non-corporate form.  This paper’s 
approach, therefore, is to look not at one aspect of corporate governance, but rather at the 
foundation upon which governance is based, organizational form.  Specifically, this study 
explores whether British mutual funds organized in corporate form (the OEICs) charge 
different expenses than British mutual funds organized in trust form (the unit trusts), or 
generate different risk-taking behavior and performance.     
 
IV.  Data 
 
                                                 
61
 Ajay Khorana et al., Board Structure, Mergers and Shareholder Wealth: A Study of the Mutual Fund 
Industry, 85 J. Fin. Econ. 571 (2007).  
62
 Sophie Xiaofei Kong & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Mutual Fund Governance: What Works and What 
Doesn’t? (Kansas State University, Working Paper, 2006).  
63
 Stephen Ferris, Agency Costs, Governance, and Organizational Form: Evidence from the Mutual Fund 
Industry (University of Kansas, Working Paper Series, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=970547.  
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There is no survivorship bias-free electronic database of British mutual funds that 
is widely available.  Consequently, I created my own such database by collecting and 
manually inputting fund-level data from consecutive print editions of the Unit Trust and 
OEICs Yearbook, which is published annually by the Financial Times.  The Yearbooks 
contain data on management fees, front-end loads, fund and family size, date of 
inception, fund style, fund family, and whether the fund is organized as a corporation 
(OEIC) or a trust (unit trust), for all funds in the United Kingdom.  Data is obtained on an 
annual basis for the years 1996 through 2001, inclusive.64  Returns data is obtained on a 
monthly basis from Datastream and manually linked to funds in the data set.  For funds 
which change organizational form, observations in the year of conversion are dropped.  
The Yearbook did not report organizational form in year 2000.  For that year, I classify a 
fund as an OEIC if it reported itself as an OEIC in both (i) year 2001 and (ii) year 1999 
(or 1998 if the fund or its organizational status was missing in year 1999).  I use the same 
approach to classify funds as unit trusts in year 2000.   
Table 1 reports the age, size and number of funds organized as corporations and 
unit trusts, by year.  Overall, corporate funds are younger than unit trusts.  The median 
age of corporate funds drops over time, as more such funds are created de novo, or anew 
(as opposed to conversion from a unit trust).  In terms of total net assets, the median 
corporate fund is initially smaller than the median unit trust, but quickly equals or 
surpasses the median unit trust.  The number of corporate funds increases over time.  
While only 45 exist in 1997, almost 600 exist in 2001.  Corporate funds steadily gain 
market share each year, constituting approximately 40% of the market by 2001 (the last 
year of the data set).  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate graphically the consistent market share 
gains of corporations (by number of funds in the case of Figure 1, and by assets under 
management in the case of Figure 2).  Although corporate funds gain market share 
steadily, do they behave differently from trusts?   
 
V.  Expenses 
 
                                                 
64
 The Financial Times ceased publication of the Yearbook in 2001. 
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This section presents empirical results with respect to fund expenses.  Since it is 
generally argued that lower expenses reflect better governance,65 lower expenses should 
also reflect a superior organizational form.  Thus, this section examines the relationship 
between expenses and organizational form in the British mutual fund industry.  The 
hypothesis is that, due to the different fiduciary obligations, unit trusts and corporations 
will charge significantly different expenses.  This section analyzes two types of expenses, 
annual management fees and front-end loads.66   
Summary statistics for annual management fees appear in Panel A of Table 2.  
The average management fee for unit trusts is 1.21%, while the average management fee 
for corporate funds is 1.27%.  The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Thus, the trust form, on average, charges lower annual management fees than the 
corporate form.   
Summary statistics for front-end loads appear in Panel B of Table 2.  The average 
front-end load for unit trusts is 4.25%, while the average front-end load for corporate 
funds is 4.01%.  The difference is significant at the 1% level.  Thus, the trust form 
appears to be associated with higher front-end loads.  Funds charge front-end loads 
primarily to cover the cost of distributing the fund.67  The difference in front-end loads 
may indicate that corporate funds are sold and distributed through different channels than 
unit trusts.  With lower front-end loads on average, the typical corporate fund is likely 
relying more on direct sales and other no-load channels, while the typical unit trust is 
likely relying more on brokers and other intermediaries.  Recent research shows that 
differences in distribution channels have ramifications for investors as well as funds and 
                                                 
65
 E.g., Diane Guercio et al., Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End Investment Companies, 
69 J. Fin. Econ. 111 (2003).  
66
 This study analyzes management fees, not expense ratios.  An expense ratio combines a fund’s 
management fee with other operating fees of the fund.  Studies of U.S. mutual funds typically examine 
expense ratios because by law each mutual fund must contract separately with various service providers 
(administrator, custodian, distributor, etc.) in addition to the entity that manages the fund.  In the U.K., 
however, the fund’s management company is responsible for providing all services to the fund, except for 
custodial services, which must be provided by an independent custodian.  Funds may charge a separate 
custodial fee, but few funds do and the custodial fees are very low.  The use of management fees to proxy 
for fund expenses is consistent with other studies of British mutual funds. Aneel Keswani & David Stolin, 
Which Money is Smart? Mutual Fund Buys and Sells of Individual and Institutional Investors, 63 J. Fin. 85 
(2008); and Roger Otten & Dennis Bams, European Mutual Fund Performance, 8 European Fin. 
Management 75 (2002).  
67
 There is no British equivalent of the U.S.’s 12b-1 fee, which U.S. funds may periodically charge to cover 
distribution costs.  Hence, loads must perform that role in the U.K. 
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their managers.68  In addition, it is important to also consider loads net of any waivers.  
Funds in the U.K. often waive some or all of the front-end load for investors.  Analyzing 
loads net of waivers is important because it captures what investors actually pay.  
Summary statistics for net loads appear in Panel C of Table 2.  The average net load for 
unit trusts is 1.86%, while the average net load for corporate funds is 1.95%.  The 
difference is significant at the 10% level.  Thus, the average trust charges significantly 
lower net loads.  Overall, on average, unit trusts charge lower management fees and 
lower net loads than corporate funds.69,70   
To understand if and how organizational form is responsible for the differences in 
management fees and front-end loads, I regress fees and loads, in turn, on a corporate 
dummy variable, with control variables.  The hypothesis is that a fund’s choice of 
organizational form will have a statistically significant impact on its management fees 
and/or front-end loads.  To test the impact of organizational form on fund expenses, I 
estimate the following: 
yi,t = α + β1Ii,t + β2Xi,t-1 + δj + γf + εi,t.      (1) 
        
Here, i indexes fund, t indexes time (year), j indexes investment style, f indexes fund 
family, and α is a constant term.  Ii,t is the variable of interest and takes a value of one if a 
fund is a corporation and zero if it is a unit trust.  Xi,t-1 represents a set of control 
variables.  δj represents fund investment style (such as International Equity or Domestic 
Money Market) and captures the different operating costs associated with different 
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 See Susan Christoffersen et al., The Economics of Mutual-Fund Brokerage: Evidence from the Cross 
Section of Investment Channels (American Finance Association of Boston, Working Paper, 2006); Steven 
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(University of Texas, Working Paper Series, 2006), available at 
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investment styles.71  γf  represents family affiliation, and εi,t is the error term.  The 
dependent variable, yi,t, is fund expenses, represented by annual management fees (in 
percent) in the first set of regressions, and front-end loads (in percent) in the second.  
 Fund expenses should reflect the ability of the fund’s managers (the value they 
add) as well as the difficulty of their job (the skill required of them).  We can control for 
each such factor using available data.  Prior performance reflects managerial ability;72 
hence, I include as a control variable the prior 12-month total return of the fund.73  Fund 
investment style proxies for job complexity; hence, I include as a control variable the 
fund’s style.74  Control variables also include other factors that, according to the 
literature, tend to affect fund expenses: fund size (in log form),75 family size (in log 
form), fund age (in log form), an index fund dummy, and the front-end load (in the 
management fee regressions) or the management fee (in the load regression) charged by 
the fund.  All control variables are lagged by one year, to lessen potential endogeneity.  I 
report results using multiple regression specifications.  One is an OLS regression with 
robust standard errors that treats each observation as independent.  Second, I employ 
clustered regressions where each fund is treated as a cluster.  Clustering by fund adjusts 
standard errors to control for potential lack of independence in fee decisions made by a 
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 In the United Kingdom, each fund is assigned to an official style category, based on the type of securities 
it holds, by the Investment Management Association, the industry association for the U.K. investment 
management industry.   
72
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 I have also employed, as an alternative performance measure, annualized risk-adjusted returns (alphas) 
computed as described in Section VI.  The results are similar to the reported results using annualized total 
returns. 
74
 To fully control for job complexity, I have tried incorporating measures of fund risk, including 
idiosyncratic risk as well as total return volatility.  The results are similar to the reported results using only 
investment style. 
75
 Due to the potential for reporting errors, fund size has been winsorized at the 1% level. 
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fund.76  Third, I control for family affiliation by including family dummies.  This 
specification is appropriate if there are factors common to funds within a family, but 
heterogenous across families, that influence the fees funds charge (for instance, 
management company reputation and skill).77  
Results using management fees as the dependent variable appear in Table 3.  
According to Table 3, the corporate dummy has a statistically significant impact on 
management fees.  The coefficient on the corporate dummy takes a positive value, 
indicating that the corporate form has a positive (i.e., upward) impact on management 
fees.  The magnitude of the difference in fees is approximately 7 to 12 basis points per 
year (or 0.07% to 0.12% annually).  The upward impact of the corporate form on 
management fees is consistent with the different fiduciary duties applicable to the two 
organizational forms.  Managers of corporate funds are subject to looser fiduciary 
obligations than managers of unit trusts.  With looser fiduciary obligations should come 
greater agency costs and, presumably, greater fund fees.  This is, in fact, what we 
observe.  Exposure to stricter fiduciary liability induces trust managers to behave more 
conservatively in setting management fees.  If one believes that organizational law should 
minimize agency costs, the trust is a superior organizational form from an investor’s 
perspective relative to the corporation.   
One caveat, however, is required.  Corporate funds could be charging higher 
management fees because they are more expensive to operate than trusts (perhaps, for 
instance, they offer a greater quality or quantity of services to investors).  But that does 
not seem likely, as corporate funds are supposed to be cheaper to run than trusts.  
Corporate funds can organize in umbrella form, with multiple sub-funds.78  That is, a 
single corporate fund can be established, with various sub-funds each pursuing a different 
investment style.  Different series of shares are issued by the corporation, depending on 
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 I have also estimated regression (1) clustering by family affiliation instead of by fund.  The results are 
not qualitatively different from the reported results. 
77
 I have also estimated regression (1) annually and observed the time-series average of the coefficient 
estimates, using Fama and MacBeth to assess statistical significance (see E. Fama and J. MacBeth, Risk, 
Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. Pol. Economy. 607 (1973)). The results are not 
qualitatively different from the reported results.   
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 HM TREASURY, Open-Ended Investment Companies, 1999, at 4; U.K. Securities and Investments 
Board, Open Ended Investment Companies Consultative Paper 93, 8 (1995); and FINANCIAL TIMES, 
UNIT TRUST YEARBOOK 1996, at 52 (1996).  
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which particular sub-fund the investor selects.  Funds organized in trust form cannot do 
this.  A separate trust must be formed for each investment style.  Such duplication should 
make trusts more expensive to operate.79  Yet, the trusts charge lower management fees.  
In other words, the analysis is likely biased in favor of finding lower fees in corporations, 
due to the operational efficiencies of corporate funds under the British regulatory 
structure.  Instead, the evidence reveals that the corporations do not pass their cost 
efficiencies on to investors.   
Note the economic significance of organizational form.  Its impact on fund fees is 
about one-quarter (in absolute value) that of the variable with the largest impact on fees, 
the index fund dummy.  The economic significance of passive versus active management 
on fees and performance is well-documented in the academic literature and popular 
media (index funds do not require the same degree of managerial effort or expense as 
actively managed funds).  It is noteworthy that a variable so innocuous as choice of 
organizational form (in fact, so seemingly innocuous that the literature has overlooked it) 
has an impact of about a quarter the impact of a variable known to be so important, active 
versus passive management.  Looking at it another way, the impact of organizational 
form amounts to nearly 10% of the average management fee.  In dollar terms, an investor 
with $100,000 would pay $1,270 on average in annual management fees when investing 
in a corporation, but would save about $100 per year by investing in an equivalent trust 
instead of a corporation.  Or, look at it from a fund manager’s perspective.  Holding 
everything else constant, a manager of a trust of average size (£37 million) receives an 
extra £37,000 per year simply by organizing it as a corporation instead of a trust.  
 Regarding the other variables, note that fund size is either not significant 
(specifications (1) and (2)) or significant and positive (specification (3)), indicating that 
any economies of scale at the fund level are not being shared with investors.  Family size 
is significant and negative in specifications (1) and (2), however, indicating that 
economies of scale at the family level are shared with investors.  Fund age is significant 
in specification (3), with older funds associated with higher fees.  The fact that age and 
                                                 
79
 Standard Life Investments, which converted its funds from trusts to corporations, did so because it 
believed “it was cheaper to run them because there was only one authorized product to administer.”  Clare 
Gascoigne, “Unit Trust ‘Cheaper than OEICs,’” Financial Times (Aug. 21, 1999) at 18.  The umbrella 
structure “has proved economical … overseas.”  HM TREASURY, Open-Ended Investment Companies, 
1999, at 4. 
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size are significant only in the presence of family controls indicates that variation in age 
and size within a family matters.  It may be that management companies use their older 
and larger funds to subsidize their younger and smaller funds.80  Finally, in accordance 
with the literature,81 prior fund performance does not impact fees significantly.82      
The finding that organizational form impacts management fees is consistent with 
Warburton (2008).83  That paper finds that the corporate form has a significant but 
negative impact on management fees and loads.  That paper, however, was confined to a 
limited data set which did not allow the model to control for time-varying effects and 
family-level characteristics.84  When I supplement that paper’s data set to allow for a 
model specification more similar to the specification used in this paper, namely by 
controlling for family affiliation, family size, and loads, the sign on the corporate dummy 
becomes positive while remaining significant.  In other words, when I apply the model 
used in this paper to the supplemented Warburton (2008) data, I obtain consistent results. 
Results with respect to front-end loads appear in Table 4 (columns (1), (2), and 
(3)).  Unlike the case with management fees, the coefficient on the corporate dummy is 
negative and significant, indicating that the corporate form has a negative (i.e., 
downward) impact on front-end loads.  The negative impact of the corporate form on 
loads is surprising given that corporate funds, in theory, can be distributed to an 
international clientele while unit trusts cannot.  Front-end loads are charged in large part 
to cover distribution costs.  Funds distributed internationally might be expected to have 
greater distribution costs and hence greater loads.  However, the corporation’s downward 
impact on loads is consistent with anecdotal evidence that fund sponsors did not penetrate 
the continent in these initial years.85     
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 See Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 
46 J. Fin. Econ. 321 (1997); Diane Guercio et al., Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End 
Investment Companies, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 111 (2003).  
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 E.g., Tufano and Sevick. 
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 In addition to 12-month total return, I have also estimated regression (1) using other measures of fund 
performance and riskiness, including risk-adjusted  returns and volatility of returns.  However, the 
estimated coefficient on the corporate dummy does not qualitatively differ from the reported results. 
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 A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal & Econometric Analysis, 33 J. 
Corp. L. 745 (2008).  
84
 The Warburton (2008) paper  employs a cross-sectional data set derived electronically from Morningstar.   
85
 See supra note 28. 
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The corporate form’s relative advantage with respect to front-end loads 
disappears, however, when loads are netted against waivers.  As Table 4 shows, the 
corporate dummy has an upward and significant impact on net loads in (4) and (5).  
Everything else equal, corporate managers charge greater net loads than trust managers.  
Net loads are a more accurate measure than the stated loads of what investors pay in 
upfront fees.  By incorporating waivers into the analysis, we see that unit trusts provide 
greater discounts on stated loads than corporate funds provide.   
Since loads are primarily intended to cover distribution costs, management fees 
are a cleaner measure of agency costs and, consequently, I have regressed loads and fees 
separately.  Some studies attempt to combine loads and fees by amortizing loads over an 
assumed holding period for a hypothetical investor, and adding that amount to the annual 
fees (yielding a “total expense”).  I have performed such an analysis by assuming a five 
year holding period and employing net loads (following the approach taken by Tufano 
and Sevick).86  Regression results (not reported) are substantially similar to those in Table 
3.  That is, the corporate form has an upward impact on total expenses, significant at the 
1% level in specifications (1) and (2). 
In summary, the management fee regressions generate a statistically significant 
result: the corporate form has a positive (i.e., upward) impact on management fees.  The 
result is economically significant, with an impact of approximately 7 to 12 basis points 
per year in magnitude.  The corporate form also has an upward impact on net loads.  
Further, the corporate form has an upward impact on total expenses (combining 
management fees with net loads).  In other words, the trust is an organization where 
management works for you at a lower cost than in a corporation, even after controlling 
for potential differences in ability, job complexity, and other characteristics.  All else 
equal, corporate managers charge you more for doing essentially the same job.  If fund 
fees are interpreted as a signal of the quality of the governance arrangement, then the 
trust is a superior form from an investor’s perspective relative to the corporation.87 
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 Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 46 
J. Fin. Econ. 321 (1997). 
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 I have assumed that differences in organizational form cause the differences in fees.  I have assumed, in 
other words, that there is no self-selection with respect to organizational form.  I show that this assumption 
is valid in Section VII. 
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If trusts are truly superior, shareholders of corporate funds should force the 
corporation to switch to a trust, and corporate funds should disappear over time.  
However, no funds in the data set have switched from a corporation to a trust (though 59 
funds have switched from a trust to a corporation).  Given the trust’s superiority with 
respect to management fees, how does one explain the absence of corporation-to-trust 
conversions?  Mutual fund shareholders, in practice, may lack the incentives to force the 
corporation to convert.  Shareholder voting is not an effective governance mechanism in 
mutual funds due to collective action problems (mutual fund shares are dispersed widely) 
as well as the diversification and liquidity mutual funds offer.  Of course, if governance 
mechanisms are ineffective, assets could simply flow out of corporate funds and into 
trusts.  However, Figure 2 shows industry assets shifting in favor of corporations, not 
trusts.  Despite the upward impact of the corporate form on management fees, the 
industry is shifting toward, not away from, corporate funds over time.  Why do industry 
assets not shift towards trusts? One explanation is that disincentives deter the switch 
between funds.  Such disincentives include loads, redemption fees and adverse tax 
consequences.  It is not costless to switch between funds. Another explanation for the 
industry’s failure to shift towards trusts may be investors’ lack of awareness of the 
relative advantages of trusts88 and the responsiveness of fund flows to advertising by 
management companies.89  Since management companies benefit from looser corporate 
fiduciary duties, management companies have reason to favor corporate funds.  A third 
explanation for the failure of assets to shift toward the cheaper form is that the two types 
of funds might perform differently.  While trusts may be cheaper than corporations, 
perhaps they also underperform. 
 
VI.  Performance 
 
 
                                                 
88
 Lack of awareness is also seen in the insensitivity of fund flows to management fees (results are on file 
with the author). 
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 e.g., Steven Gallaher, Madison Avenue Meets Wall Street: Mutual Fund Families, Competition and 
Advertising (University of Texas, Working Paper Series, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879775; and Prem C. Jain & Johanna S. Wu, Trust in 
Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on Fund Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. Fin. 937 (2000).  
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The cost of investing in a fund is not the only consideration for investors.  
Investors ultimately care about fund performance.90  Thus, this section will examine the 
relationship between performance and organizational form.  Trust law’s strict, bright-line 
rules may encourage trust managers to incur sub-optimal levels of risk, hurting investor 
welfare in the commercial context.  In other words, while trust law may be superior to 
corporate law in controlling value-destroying agency conflict, it may do so by curtailing 
risk-taking behavior as well (which may or may not be value destroying).  This section, 
therefore, tests the “overdeterrence hypothesis” that the stricter fiduciary duties of trust 
law lead to excessive risk aversion.   
First, I examine how funds perform relative to their peers.  That is, I measure fund 
performance relative to the mean return of the fund’s investment style category.  This 
style-adjusted, or benchmark, return is computed by subtracting from each fund’s return 
the mean return of the relevant style category.  Style-adjusted returns are computed for 
each fund on a monthly basis and assume the reinvestment of dividends.  Summary 
statistics appear in Table 5 by organizational form.  Means are computed on a time-series 
basis for each organizational form, by averaging the style-adjusted returns in each month 
on an equal-weight basis, and then by averaging across months (Panel A).  The average 
one-month return (style-adjusted) is 0.023% for corporate funds and 0.005% for unit 
trusts.  The average style-adjusted return for corporations is greater than that of unit 
trusts, but not statistically so.  This is the case regardless of whether the fund returns are 
computed before fees or after fees.  In addition to the time-series approach, I have also 
taken a cross-sectional approach to computing style-adjusted returns, by computing an 
average style-adjusted return for each fund over the period, and then by computing the 
equal-weight average style-adjusted return for each type of organizational form (Panel 
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 There are, however, valid reasons to give less attention to fund performance than to fund expenses.  Fund 
expenses have been the primary focus of regulatory scrutiny and investor lawsuits.  Moreover, fund 
expenses are less noisy than returns and have been shown to predict returns.  For evidence on the inverse 
relationship between fund returns and expenses, see Marcin Kacperczyk et al., Unobserved Actions of 
Mutual Funds, in Review of Financial Studies (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
No. 11766) (forthcoming); Edwin J. Elton, Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. Fin. 
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B).  The cross-sectional approach yields results similar to those generated by the time-
series approach.    
Since performance might be driven by factors other than organizational form, I 
regress monthly style-adjusted returns on a corporate dummy variable with control 
variables.  Similar to equation (1), the model is: 
yi,t = α + β1Ii,t + β2Xi,t-1 + λk + εi,t.      (2) 
 
     
Here, the dependent variable, yi,t, is fund returns, defined as the one-month adjusted 
return for fund i in month t.  Ii,t is the variable of interest, Xi,t-1 is a set of control 
variables, and λk represents time (month) effects.  Control variables include fund size (in 
log form), family size (in log form), fund age (in log form), an index fund dummy, the 
fund’s front-end load and management fee, and the fund’s prior performance.  Prior 
performance is lagged by one month; all other controls are as of the last day of the 
preceding year.  I measure prior performance using, alternatively, 1-month returns and 
12-month returns.  The 12-month returns have greater economic content than the 1-month 
returns, but they potentially introduce greater bias.  Consequently, I report one 
specification with the 1-month returns, one with the 12-month returns, and one without 
returns.  
 According to Table 6, the corporate dummy has a statistically significant impact 
on returns.  Holding everything else constant, the corporate form improves performance 
by 12 to 14 basis points per month relative to the trust form (or by 1.45% to 1.69% per 
year).  This evidence supports the “overdeterrence hypothesis” that the stricter fiduciary 
duties of trust law lead to more conservative trust management and lower performance.  
In other words, although the corporate form is associated with higher management fees (7 
to 12 basis points per year), the corporate form offers investors significantly superior 
fund performance on a gross basis (145 to 169 basis points per year) to compensate for 
charging those higher fees.  This result implies that corporate funds are generating 
superior returns, on a net basis, relative to unit trusts.  Investors in corporate funds are 
paying higher fees for that choice of organizational form but, since the corporate form 
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positively impacts gross style-adjusted returns by a greater amount, they receive greater 
net returns.91   
The statistically significant control variables include fund size (negative 
coefficient), fund age (positive coefficient), and prior performance (positive coefficient 
on both one-month and one-year lagged returns, indicating momentum in fund returns).  
The management fee variable is not statistically significant, indicating that higher fees do 
not translate into significantly higher style-adjusted performance.   
Style-adjusted returns alone, however, do not reveal much information about the 
value managers add.  Corporate funds may be generating higher returns either because of 
superior security-selection skill or because they are simply incurring more risk than the 
trusts.  There is evidence that corporate funds incur greater risk than the trusts.  Corporate 
funds exhibit a greater dispersion of style-adjusted returns than unit trusts, evidenced by 
the difference in the standard deviation of returns in Table 5.  The higher style-adjusted 
returns of corporate funds, therefore, may simply reflect a premium for higher risk.  In 
other words, while style-adjusted returns control for differences in risk across investment 
styles, they do not control for such differences within investment styles.  Thus, in 
addition to style-adjusted returns, I also examine risk-adjusted abnormal returns (or 
alphas).   
First, I compute a single-factor alpha, the intercept in a regression of fund returns 
(in excess of the risk-free rate) on the return on a market proxy (in excess of the risk-free 
rate).  The alpha in a single-factor model gives the over- or under-performance of funds 
relative to the market proxy.  Alphas are calculated separately for each type of 
organization, on a cross-sectional basis, using the following single-index model: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βi(RALL,t – Rf,t) + εi,t      (3) 
 
where Ri,t is the one-month return of fund i in month t, Rf,t is the return on British treasury 
bills in month t, RALL,t is the one-month return on the market index in month t, and αi is 
the risk-adjusted abnormal return of fund i.  The analysis is restricted to U.K. domestic 
equity funds.  The average (equal-weight) risk-adjusted abnormal return (alpha) and 
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factor loadings appear in Panel A of Table 7, for each type of organization.  This risk-
adjusted approach reveals a divergence in the performance of corporations and trusts.  On 
a gross (before fee) basis, corporations generate alphas of 16 basis points per month, 
while trusts generate alphas of -12 basis points per month.  Corporate managers are able 
to create positive value while trust managers destroy value.  Moreover, the difference in 
performance between corporations and trusts is economically substantial, amounting to 
over 28 basis points per month, or approximately 3.36% per year.  That is, corporations 
generate economically meaningful gains relative to trusts.  After management fees are 
deducted, corporations continue to create value, while trusts continue to destroy value.   
Corporations generate net (after fee) alphas of 6 basis points, while trusts generate net 
alphas of -22 basis points.  This difference in after-fee performance between trusts and 
corporations is, again, 28 basis points per month, or approximately 3.36% per year.  In 
sum, whether alphas are measured before or after fees, corporations outperform trusts by 
about 3.36% annually.  
The above single-factor model assumes a fund’s investment behavior can be 
approximated using a single market index.  Because of the variety of mutual fund 
investment styles, it is preferable to use a multi-factor model to account for such diversity 
of investment strategies.  Hence, I also compute risk-adjusted abnormal returns from a 
multi-factor model.92  In addition to a market proxy, the model includes factors for size, 
book-to-market, and momentum.  Formally, alphas are calculated from the following 
model: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βi(RALL,t – Rf,t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + miMOMt + εi,t        (4) 
 
where SBMt is the difference in one-month returns in month t between a portfolio of 
small cap stocks and a portfolio of large cap stocks; HMLt is the difference in one-month 
returns in month t between a portfolio containing “value” stocks (with a high book-to-
market ratio) and one containing “growth” stocks (with a low book-to-market ratio); and 
MOMt is the difference in one-month returns in month t between a portfolio of past 
winners and a portfolio of past losers.  The other variables, Rf,t, RALL,t, and αi, are as 
defined previously.  As before, I compute risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) on a 
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cross-sectional basis.  To compute the size factor (SMBt), I rank all stocks in the United 
Kingdom based on market capitalization as of the last day of December each year, with 
the bottom 30% assigned to the small cap portfolio and the top 30% assigned to the large 
cap portfolio.  The difference in returns between the small cap portfolio and the large cap 
portfolio over the subsequent months provides the size factor returns.  Similarly, to 
compute the momentum factor (MOMt), I rank all stocks in the United Kingdom based 
on their prior 12-month return as of the last day of December each year, with the bottom 
30% assigned to a portfolio of contrarian stocks and the top 30% assigned to a portfolio 
of momentum stocks.  The difference in returns between the contrarian portfolio and the 
momentum portfolio over the subsequent months provides the momentum factor returns.  
All portfolios are value-weighted.  SBM and MOM are computed using all British 
equities contained in Datastream.  HML is taken from the international returns data 
library compiled by Kenneth French.93 
 Four-factor alphas are computed separately for each organizational form.  Four-
factor alphas and factor loadings appear in Panel B of Table 7.  Corporations generate 
statistically significant positive alphas (before fees) while trusts do not.  In other words, 
corporate managers are able to create statistically significant positive value, while trust 
managers are not.  Moreover, the difference in performance between corporations and 
trusts is economically significant, amounting to over 11 basis points per month, or 
approximately 1.32% per year.  That is, corporations generate economically meaningful 
gains relative to trusts.  After management fees are deducted, corporations continue to 
create value, but trusts destroy value.   Corporations generate net (after fee) alphas of 5 
basis points, while trusts generate net alphas of -6 basis points.  This difference in after-
fee performance between trusts and corporations is, again, over 11 basis points per 
month, or approximately 1.32% per year.  In sum, whether alphas are measured before or 
after fees, corporations outperform trusts by over 1.32% annually.94   
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 Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#International. 
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 In addition to the cross-sectional approach, I have also taken a time-series approach to computing alphas, 
by computing on each month the average return for each type of organizational form, and then computing a 
risk-adjusted return over the period for each form.  Unlike the cross-sectional approach, the time-series 
approach does not produce an economically meaningful difference in alphas because, most likely, 
differences in performance are washed out in averaging the monthly returns.   
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 We can also look at the percent of funds of each type that generate statistically 
significant positive (or negative) alphas.  Using the four-factor model, we see that 7.6% 
of corporate funds generate significant positive alphas while 7.3% of unit trusts do so 
(last column of Table 7, Panel B).  In other words, the probability of an investor selecting 
a corporate fund that generates a statistically significant positive alpha is a little better 
than the probability of an investor selecting a unit trust that does so.  There is only a 3.1% 
chance that an investor will select a corporate fund that generates significant negative 
alphas, but a 4.7% chance that an investor will select a trust that does so.  These results 
provide additional evidence that, on an individual fund basis, corporations outperform 
trusts after accounting for risk.  That is, when selecting an individual fund, an investor 
has a greater probability of receiving positive risk-adjusted returns when he or she invests 
in a corporation as opposed to a trust, and a lower probability of receiving negative risk-
adjusted returns.   
 In sum, the evidence suggests that corporations outperform trusts on a risk-
adjusted basis.  One caveat, however, is required.  The tests do not have sufficient power 
to conclusively establish the statistical significance of certain results.  Alphas are hard to 
detect due to their size.  Moreover, with open-end mutual funds, inflows can quickly 
dissipate any positive alphas.95  To detect statistical differences in such small and short-
lived phenomena with confidence, we would need a long time series of returns.  The data 
set, however, is limited to only 48 months of returns.  But while we cannot say 
conclusively that corporations outperform trusts on a risk-adjusted basis, the evidence 
does suggest that result.  Moreover, the evidence suggests that this difference in risk-
adjusted performance is quite large economically, amounting to approximately 1.32% per 
year. 
 Although I do not observe the actual portfolio holdings of the funds, I can infer 
their holdings by examining the factor loadings reported in Table 7.  The results reveal 
substantial differences in the holdings of trusts versus corporations.  First, for both types 
of funds, the loading on the market factor is close to one.  Since the data is limited to a 
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subset of domestic equity funds, both types of funds are basically doing what they are 
supposed to, investing in domestic stocks.  But the corporations have significantly higher 
loadings than the trusts on the market factor.  Corporations, hence, are taking on 
significantly greater market risk than the trusts.  Second, with respect to size, both 
corporations and trusts exhibit a tilt towards small cap stocks.  However, corporations 
show a significantly greater tilt towards small cap stocks than trusts do.  In sum, 
corporations and trusts follow different investment strategies, with corporations taking on 
more market risk and greater exposure to small cap stocks.96  In other words, the factor 
loadings indicate that corporations take on more systematic risk than the trusts.  In 
addition to their higher systematic risk, corporate funds also exhibit higher idiosyncratic 
(non-systematic) risk than trusts.  The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component 
of monthly fund returns (not shown) is 2.0839 for corporate funds and 1.8905 for unit 
trusts (using a single-factor model) and 1.7751 for corporate funds and 1.5728 for unit 
trusts (using a four-factor model).  In other words, corporations choose portfolios with 
greater risk than those that trusts choose.  That is, the difference in fiduciary standards 
translates into a difference in willingness to incur risk.   
 Overall, the evidence suggests that corporations incur greater risk than trusts, but 
that they also outperform trusts even after adjusting for the difference in risk.  This 
evidence supports the hypothesis that trust law induces excessive risk aversion.  Trust 
law’s strict fiduciary duties induce fund managers to choose portfolios with lower risk 
than those of corporate managers and, after we adjust for this difference in risk, trust 
managers under-perform corporate managers.  Hence, the evidence suggests that trust 
law’s strict fiduciary duties are value destroying in the commercial context.   
Finally, Figure 3 suggests a reason why corporations can outperform trusts: they 
are more nimble. Since the data set encompasses the stock market bubble period (1998-
1999) as well as the crash and immediate aftermath (2000-2001), we can examine 
whether one organizational form performed better than the other in one of these market 
environments.   
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Figure 3 shows each form’s relative monthly performance over 1998-2001.  The 
Figure plots the alpha generated by corporations minus the alpha generated by trusts (αtC 
- αt
T) each month over the time period.  During the bubble years (1998-1999), neither 
form appears to perform better than the other, as αtC - αtT oscillates rapidly between 
positive and negative.  In this period, neither form is able to outperform the other for 
more than two consecutive months.  During the crash, however, a pattern emerges.  
Corporate funds put together a string of months in which they outperform trusts, 
beginning in the spring of 2000 (as the stock market bubble began to burst).  It appears 
that corporate funds were more nimble in navigating the market crash.  In other words, 
the greater flexibility of the corporate form enables corporate funds to react more quickly 
to abrupt market movements and to more nimbly navigate within fast-changing market 
environments.   
 
VII.  Endogeneity Concerns 
 
This paper has assumed that organizational form is exogenous or, in other words, 
that organizational form causes the difference in the outcome variables (fund expenses 
and performance).  However, organizational form might be endogenously determined.  
That is, some unobserved factor may be influencing, for instance, both management fees 
and choice of organizational form, making it mistakenly appear as if there is a direct 
causal connection between fees and organizational form.  If so, it would be deceptive to 
say that the corporate form is causing higher management fees.  Or, causation may run in 
the opposite direction, with management fees influencing the choice of organizational 
form.  In other words, it may be that expensive funds are attracted to the corporate form.  
The underlying problem is that a fund is not assigned its organizational form randomly; 
rather, its organizational form is chosen by the fund (or by its management company on 
the fund’s behalf).  If expensive funds are self-selecting into the corporate form, this 
selection bias may be driving the results instead of the treatment effect of organizational 
form.  If this is the case, the least squares estimate of the impact of the corporate form 
overstates its true effect.  The literature has used matched samples approaches, sample 
selection model approaches, and fixed effects approaches to address these endogeneity 
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concerns.  In this section, I examine each method, as each has its own assumptions and 
tradeoffs.   
 
(i) Matched Samples Approach 
 
I first use matching methods to balance the sample along observable dimensions 
that might influence the outcome variables.  The idea behind matching is that, for any 
fund, we observe an outcome (e.g., the management fee it charges) when it is either (i) a 
corporation (exposed to the “treatment”) or (ii) a trust (not exposed to the “treatment”).  
That is, for any fund, we observe only one of the two possible outcomes.  To estimate the 
impact of organizational form on that fund, we would like to know the outcome (the fee it 
charges) both when it is a corporation and when it is a trust.  Although we only observe 
the fund when it is organized as one or the other, we can impute the missing outcome by 
finding other funds in the data whose covariates are similar to those of the particular 
fund, but which are organized in the other form (not exposed to the “treatment”).  The 
general approach is to find corporation-trust pairs where the funds are identical along 
observable dimensions except for organizational form.  Matching thus approximates 
random assignment; when you match, any difference between the two groups may be 
deemed to be random.  Under that condition, matching isolates the impact of 
organizational form on the outcome variable (management fees).  The advantage of the 
matched samples approach is that it removes potential bias from model misspecification.  
And it does so under less restrictive assumptions than other approaches, which require, 
for instance, the specification of exclusion criteria (i.e., instrumental variables) and 
assumptions about the distribution of the error terms. 
I match each corporate fund with the ten closest trusts.  Since matching with 
instruments (that is, variables that affect selection but not outcomes) does not help 
address selection bias and may worsen support problems, I match using only variables 
correlated with both the selection variable and the outcome variable.  That means, for 
management fees, I match on the basis of fund age, family size, loads, passive versus 
active management and investment style.   I do not match using fund size, as it is 
correlated with organizational form but not with fees, or using prior performance, as it is 
correlated with fees but not with organizational form.  Using the nearest neighbor 
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matching method,97  I find that the average treatment effect of the corporate form on fees 
is 0.071%, and that the effect is significant at the 1% level (Table 8).  This 7.1 basis point 
effect is roughly similar to the 7 to 12 basis point effect found in the OLS regressions in 
Table 3.  Thus, the matched samples analysis confirms the significant and upward impact 
of the corporate form on fund fees.    
Matched samples analysis requires trading off similarity of matched units with 
sample size.  This, in effect, involves trading off bias and efficiency.  I have required that 
each corporate fund be matched with ten trusts.  In the present setting, where we have 
many more trusts than corporations, requiring ten matches for each corporate fund seems 
reasonable to maximize efficiency without introducing significant bias concerns.  
However, to lower the bias potential, I also require that each corporate fund match with 
only four trusts (to ensure a more precise match on observable dimensions).  Despite the 
resulting drop in efficiency, I get similar results.  The coefficient increases slightly to 
0.072% and, although the standard error increases slightly, the effect remains significant 
at the 1% level.  Thus, the results are robust to a change in the number of matches.  In 
summary, after establishing the equivalence of corporations and trusts along observable 
dimensions, I find that the corporations charge significantly greater fees.    
 
(ii) Sample Selection Model Approach 
 
Matching handles selection on observables.  But what if unobservable factors 
drive both the outcomes (e.g., management fees) and the choice of organizational form?  
One response is to first endogenously model the choice of organizational form as the first 
step of a two-step procedure using a bivariate normal selection (Heckman) model.  The 
first step of the two-step procedure is to estimate a probit model of selection.  Since funds 
choose how to organanize, we model that choice explicitly.  Estimates from this probit 
model are then used to construct consistent estimates of the inverse Mills ratio.  In the 
second stage, the outcome equation is estimated by ordinary least squares, and includes 
the original independent variables from the main regression augmented by the 
                                                 
97
 Alberto Abadie et al., Implementing Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effect in Stata, 4 The 
Stata Journal 290 (2004).  
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constructed value of the inverse Mills ratio, which controls for omitted variable bias due 
to self-selection.   
Specifying a proper “exclusion restriction” is crucial.  The exclusion restriction is 
the specification of a variable that “belongs” in the selection equation but not in the 
outcome equation.  In other words, it is an instrument.  The model is formally identified 
without an exclusion restriction (the identification comes from the non-linearity of the 
inverse Mills ratio), but this often produces substantial colinearity between the predicted 
inverse Mills ratio term and the remaining covariates in the outcome equation. This 
colinearity will lead to large standard errors.  A proper exclusion restriction requires us to 
identify a variable associated with organizational form but not the outcome (i.e., 
management fees).  An ideal instrument is whether the fund receives flows from foreign 
investors.  Since corporate funds can be marketed abroad and trusts cannot, such a 
variable is associated with organizational form but likely does not have a direct impact 
management fees.  However, data on foreign flows is not available.  Instead, I use fund 
size to proxy for foreign flows.  Funds choose the corporate form in order to have access 
to foreign markets and a greater pool of investors.  In other words, they choose the 
corporate form because they want to grow in size.  Size, therefore, should be a good 
substitute for foreign flows.  In the data, size in fact is highly correlated with the 
corporate form, but uncorrelated with fees.  Hence, specifying size as the exclusion 
restriction should give us confidence that the identification structure will work.      
Estimates from the selection and outcome equations are reported in Table 9.  First 
note the significant positive impact of size in the probit regression (column (1)), 
confirming the theory that size predicts corporate form.  In the ordinary least squares 
regression (column (2)), the coefficient on the corporate dummy is positive and 
significant at the 1% level despite the inclusion of λ (the inverse Mills ratio).  That is, 
after controlling for potential selection bias, the corporate form has an upward impact on 
fees, and its magnitude (16 basis points) is even larger than in the main results (7 to 12 
basis points).  Moreover, the coefficient on λ is not significant, indicating no substantial 
selection effect.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no selection bias in the 
outcome equation.  In other words, it appears likely that our main results are not driven 
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by selection bias.98  In all, the sample selection model indicates that the corporate form’s 
impact on fees is being driven by the treatment effect, not the selection effect.   
 
(iii) Fund Fixed Effects Approach 
 
The idea behind a fixed effects specification is to use the repeated observations on 
funds in the panel to control for those unobserved and unchanging characteristics related 
to both outcomes and causing variables.  In other words, it exploits repeated observations 
on funds to control for unobserved fund characteristics that are time-invariant.  The fund 
fixed effects approach, however, is a simple and extreme approach to addressing 
endogeneity.  Fixed effects estimators estimate the effects of only the time-varying 
regressors.  That is, the fixed effects approach ignores cross-sectional variation in 
organizational form, exploiting only its time-series variation.  However, our regressor of 
interest, the corporate dummy, does not have much time-series variation.  Only 59 funds 
have been conclusively identified as having changed organizational form, and I lack 
complete data on all of those 59 funds.  Thus, the fixed effects approach has fewer than 
59 funds to work with.  With insufficient time variation in organizational form, it would 
be difficult to distinguish the impact of organizational form from the impact of the time-
invariant unobservables.  If the corporate dummy is, in effect, not time-varying, its effect 
cannot be conclusively determined using fixed effects.  The data set is simply not rich 
enough for a fund fixed effects model to isolate the impact of organizational form.  The 
other two approaches employed in the section, which handle endogeneity through 
different means, are more informative.   
 
(iv) Evaluation 
 
The impact of the corporate form on fees is most likely due to organizational form 
and not selection bias.  Multiple regression methodologies for handling endogeneity 
concerns point to this conclusion.  Using matched samples, I find that the corporate form 
has a significant upward impact on fees, similar in magnitude to the impact in my main 
                                                 
98
 Note that when no exclusion restriction is specified, the significance of the corporate dummy disappears.  
However, it appears that this result is driven by the large standard errors that are generated by removing the 
exclusion restriction.  Of course, it is unnecessary to endure the inefficiency and restrictive assumptions of 
this specification, as we have a compelling exclusion restriction (size) to help with identification.   
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results.  This result is robust to changes in the number of matches.  In addition, using a 
sample selection model, I reach the same conclusion.  The corporate form has a 
significant upward impact on fees, again similar in magnitude to the impact in my main 
results.  The sample selection model also sheds light on why funds choose the corporate 
form.  The stage I probit model, and correlations in the data, indicate that funds become 
corporations in order to grow in size.  After controlling for that motivation for choosing 
the corporate form, as well as other potential motivations, I find that organizational form 
has a significant impact.  In conclusion, my earlier results appear to be driven not by 
endogeneity but by the effect of organizational form. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
This paper identifies, empirically, costs and benefits associated with competing 
organizational forms.  The paper does so by exploiting a change in British regulations in 
the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either a trust or a corporation.  Trust 
law imposes stricter fiduciary responsibilities on managers than corporate law does.  I 
find evidence suggesting that trust law is more effective in curtailing opportunistic 
behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than their corporate 
counterparts, even after accounting for potential differences in managerial ability and job 
complexity.  I confirm that these results are driven by differences in organizational form 
and not by self-selection.  The results suggest that trust law’s strict fiduciary duties are a 
superior mechanism for mitigating agency conflict within business organizations.  While 
strict fiduciary responsibilities limit opportunistic behavior, they also constrain 
managerial flexibility in business decision making.  I find that trust managers exhibit 
greater risk aversion than their corporate counterparts.  Evidence suggests that, even after 
this difference in risk taking is accommodated, the trusts underperform the corporations.  
The business flexibility granted to the corporate funds leads to greater risk-taking 
behavior and greater agency costs, but also to potentially superior risk-adjusted 
performance as well.  Overall, this paper finds that fiduciary rules which curtail 
managerial discretion reduce agency costs and risk taking within the firm, but at the 
possible cost of sacrificing risk-adjusted performance.   
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The results have implications for investors.  In equilibrium, investors should 
prefer to invest via the corporate structure.  All else equal, on average, the trust form 
saves investors about 10 basis points (or 0.10%) per year in agency costs, but costs 
investors about 132 basis points (or 1.32%) per year in performance.  In other words, 
while trust law’s strict fiduciary duties are a superior mechanism for mitigating agency 
conflict, the economic significance of the agency cost savings are overwhelmed by the 
economic significance of the negative performance impact.  To see this more clearly, 
consider a hypothetical investor with $100,000 to invest.  The investor can choose one of 
two investments, identical in every respect, except one is structured as a trust and the 
other as a corporation.  That investor would save about $100 per year in fees, on average, 
by investing in the trust instead of the corporation.  However, that investment would earn 
the investor about $1,300 per year less, on average, in gross returns.  On a net basis, the 
investor is worse off having invested in the trust.  In other words, the trust’s 
underperformance more than offsets its cost savings.  Trust law mitigates agency conflict, 
but it does so by “overdeterring” trust management.    
The results also have implications for corporate governance design.  The results 
suggest that strengthening fiduciary responsibilities by moving corporate law closer to 
trust law can lessen the potential for expropriation, fraud, and opportunistic behavior by 
corporate managers.  Heightened fiduciary duties can also reduce managerial risk-taking 
behavior.  While these concepts are intuitive, this paper has been able to demonstrate 
them empirically and to quantify their effects.  Moreover, this paper suggests that such 
results are achieved at the cost of lower risk-adjusted performance.  While trust law may 
be superior at controlling value-destroying agency conflict, it appears to do so by 
curtailing desirable risk-taking behavior to an extent that is value-destroying in the 
commercial context.      
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Figure 1 
Composition of Fund Market by Number of Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Composition of Fund Market by Assets under Management 
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Figure 3 
Relative Risk-Adjusted Performance 
 
The Figure plots the alpha generated by corporate funds minus the alpha generated by trusts (αC – αT) in 
each month. 
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Table 1 
Age, Size and Number of Funds  
 
Age, size and number of funds in the data set.  Mutual funds are grouped according to organizational form 
(corporation versus unit trust) and by year.  Median figures are provided for size and age. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Overall 
(A)  Age (years) 
Corporations    n.a. 10.13  8.13  5.00   5.42  6.89   6.17 
Unit Trusts   9.09   8.59  9.17  8.84 10.29  9.02   9.09 
 
(B)  Size (£ millions) 
Corporations    n.a. 22.10 54.50 45.20 70.30 51.50 53.30 
Unit Trusts  29.10 32.30 34.00 47.30 60.60 51.80 37.40 
 
(C) Number 
Corporations         n.a.       45    174    364    259    579    701 
Unit Trusts  1,592 1,317 1,427 1,377    709    925 2,419 
Unclassified        0    231        0        0    531        0     748  
Total 1,592 1,593 1,601 1,741 1,499  1,504 3,868 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics on Expenses  
 
Summary statistics for mutual funds in the data set, on an equal-weight basis.  Mutual funds are grouped 
according to organizational form (corporation versus unit trust).  Panel A presents summary statistics on 
annual management fees (in percent).  Panel B presents summary statistics on front-end loads (in percent).   
Panel C presents summary statistics on front-end loads netted against waivers (in percent).   
 
     Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
(A) Management Fees 
Corporations    1,403 1.27 1.30 0.33 0.00 3.00 
Unit Trusts    7,277 1.21 1.25 0.40 0.00 8.75 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust)     0.06*** 
 
(B) Front-End Loads 
Corporations  1,406 4.01 4.50 1.60 0.00   9.00 
Unit Trusts 7,323 4.25 5.00 1.90 0.00 10.00 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust) -0.24*** 
 
(C) Front-End Loads Net of Waivers 
Corporations    1,164  1.95  2.00 1.74 0.00   6.00  
Unit Trusts   6,192  1.86  1.25 1.70 0.00 10.00 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust)  0.09* 
  
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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Table 3 
 
Regression Results for Management Fees 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of annual management fees (in percent) on a corporate dummy (equal to 
1 for a corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  All observations are annual.  All 
independent variables (except the corporate dummy) are lagged by one year.  Observations in the year in 
which a fund changes organizational form are dropped.  Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  
Columns (2) and (3) adjust standard errors for clustering by fund. 
 
Dependent Variable: Management Fees 
    (1)    (2) (3)  
Corporate Dummy   0.067   0.067   0.117  
    (0.015)*** (0.021)*** (0.044)***  
Size (log)   0.002   0.002  0.012  
   (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)*  
Age (log)   0.012   0.012  0.026  
   (0.007) (0.011)  (0.011)**  
Family Size (log)  -0.022  -0.022 -0.003  
   (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)  
Load     0.043   0.043  0.069  
   (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** 
Index Fund Dummy  -0.357  -0.357 -0.406  
   (0.046)*** (0.063)*** (0.066)***  
12-Month Return   0.000   0.000 -0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Constant   1.064   1.064  0.735  
   (0.372)*** (0.388)*** (0.212)***  
Style Controls    Yes  Yes  Yes     
Family Controls    No  No  Yes     
Fund Clusters    No  Yes  Yes    
Observations  3,142 3,142 3,142  
Adjusted R2    0.26  0.26 0.50   
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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Table 4 
 
Regression Results for Loads 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of front-end loads (in percent) on a corporate dummy (equal to 1 for a 
corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  Loads are before waivers in columns 
(1) through (3), and after waivers in columns (4) through (6).  All observations are annual.  All independent 
variables (except the corporate dummy) are lagged by one year.  Observations in the year in which a fund 
changes organizational form are dropped.  Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  Columns (2), 
(3), (5) and (6) adjust standard errors for clustering by fund. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Front-End Loads (Before Waivers) Front-End Loads (After Waivers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Dummy -0.339 -0.339 -0.661  0.253  0.253 -0.057 
   (0.071)*** (0.102)*** (0.150)*** (0.090)*** (0.119)** (0.198) 
Size (log) -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015 -0.045  
  (0.023) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.031) 
Age (log)  0.172  0.172  0.100 -0.057 -0.057 -0.111 
  (0.040)*** (0.054)*** (0.044)** (0.047) (0.061) (0.052)** 
Family Size (log) -0.044 -0.044 -0.155 -0.086 -0.086  0.103 
  (0.022)** (0.037) (0.035)*** (0.028)*** (0.043)** (0.059)* 
Management Fee  0.915  0.915  1.081  0.131  0.131  0.264 
  (0.113)*** (0.174)*** (0.167)*** (0.105) (0.149) (0.141)* 
Index Fund Dummy -2.309 -2.309 -0.808 -1.557 -1.557 -0.599 
  (0.261)*** (0.411)*** (0.320)** (0.144)*** (0.175)*** (0.230)*** 
12-Month Return  0.002  0.002  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant  3.888  3.888  5.342  2.408  2.408 -1.125 
  (0.509)*** (0.768)*** (0.997)*** (0.615)*** (0.868)*** (1.547) 
Style Controls   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Family Controls   No No Yes No No Yes    
Fund Clusters   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,143 3,143 3,143  2,549  2,549  2,549 
Adjusted R2  0.25  0.25  0.63 0.07 0.07 0.49 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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 Table 5 
 
Summary Statistics on Style-Adjusted Returns  
 
Summary statistics on one-month style-adjusted returns (in percent) on an equal-weight basis for all funds 
in the data set.  Returns are computed monthly on a gross (before management fee) basis, assume re-
investment of dividends and are adjusted by subtracting the mean return of the applicable style.  In Panel A, 
style-adjusted returns are computed on a time-series basis (by computing on each month an average style-
adjusted return for each type of organizational form, and then computing the average style-adjusted return 
over the period for each type of organizational form).  In Panel B, style-adjusted returns are computed on a 
cross-sectional basis (by computing the average style-adjusted return for each fund over the period, and 
then computing the average style-adjusted return for each type of organizational form).   
 
     - - - - Mean - - - - 
  Before After  - - - - - - - - - Before Fees - - - - - - - - - - - 
  Obs.   Fees Fees Median Std. Dev.  Min.   Max. 
(A) Time-Series 
Corporations      58   0.023 0.018 -0.018 0.526 -1.323   1.967 
Unit Trusts      58   0.005 0.006  0.014 0.10 2 -0.337   0.303 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust)         0.018 0.012   
 
(B) Cross-Sectional 
Corporations      123  -0.054 -0.053 -0.050 0.488 -1.348   1.813 
Unit Trusts      969   0.021  0.020  0.005 0.476 -6.028   2.963 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust)        -0.075  -0.073     
 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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Table 6 
 
Regression Results for Style-Adjusted Returns 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of one-month style-adjusted returns (in percent) on a corporate dummy 
(equal to 1 for a corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  Returns are computed 
monthly on a gross (pre-expense) basis, assume reinvestment of dividends, and are adjusted by subtracting 
the mean return of the applicable style.  Regressions correct for time effects.  The independent return 
variables are lagged by one month.  All other control variables are as of the end of the prior year.   
Observations in the year in which a fund changes organizational form are dropped.  Robust standard errors 
based on fund clusters are shown in parenthesis. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Style-Adjusted Returns 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Corporate Dummy   0.142   0.132   0.123 
   (0.055)***  (0.049)***  (0.049)** 
Size (log)  -0.035  -0.033  -0.033 
   (0.012)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)*** 
Age (log)   0.054   0.050   0.054 
   (0.026)**  (0.023)**  (0.027)** 
Family Size (log)   0.000  -0.000   0.001 
   (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Management Fee   0.048   0.042   0.019 
   (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.042) 
Front-End Load  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Index Fund Dummy  -0.030  -0.031  -0.020 
   (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.045) 
One-Month Return     0.071   
     (0.025)***   
One-Year Return       0.015   
       (0.002)***   
Constant   0.053   0.056   0.027 
   (0.245)  (0.229)  (0.223) 
Time Controls    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Observations  39,626  39,612  39,312 
Adjusted R2     0.00    0.01    0.01 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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Table 7 
Risk-Adjusted Returns and Factor Loadings 
One-month risk-adjusted returns and factor loadings (in percent), computed on an equal-weight basis.  
Risk-adjusted returns (alphas) are computed on both a gross (before management fee) and a net (after 
management fee) basis.  The data set consists of 48 months of data and is restricted to U.K. domestic equity 
funds.  Risk-adjusted returns are computed on a cross-sectional basis (by computing the risk-adjusted return 
for each fund, and then computing an average risk-adjusted return for each type of organizational form).  
Factor loadings are computed similarly.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  The last column gives 
percent of funds with significant positive/negative risk-adjusted returns.      
 - - Return (Alpha) - - - - - - - - - Factor Loadings (Before Fees)- - - - - - - - Percent 
 Before Fee After Fee Market Size Value Momentum pos/neg 
(A) Single-Factor Model 
 
Corporations  0.1605  0.0567 1.1194   6.6/ 2.2 
 (0.0980) (0.0982) (0.0353)*** 
Unit Trusts -0.1238 -0.2231 1.0323       6.8/ 5.0 
 (0.2324) (0.2314) (0.0517)*** 
Difference   0.2843  0.2798 0.0871       -0.2/-2.8 
(Corp-Trust) (0.3606) (0.3602) (0.0823) 
  
(B) Four-Factor Model 
 
Corporations  0.1582  0.0541 1.1041  0.1418 -0.0646 -0.0157   7.6/ 3.1 
 (0.0933)* (0.0932) (0.0325)*** (0.0177)*** (0.0120)*** (0.0063)** 
Unit Trusts  0.0443 -0.0596 0.9876  0.0963 -0.0455  0.0099   7.3/ 4.7 
 (0.1079) (0.1076) (0.0205)*** (0.0135)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0056)* 
Difference   0.1139  0.1137 0.1165  0.0455   -0.0191 -0.0256   0.3/-1.6 
(Corp-Trust) (0.1757) (0.1756) (0.0378)*** (0.0237)* (0.0228) (0.0095)***  
 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; *10% significance 
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Table 8 
 
Matched Sample Analysis: 
Management Fees 
 
Treatment (corporation) and control (unit trust) groups are based on fund age, family size, loads, passive 
versus active management and investment style.   The mean difference between the management fees of 
these two groups is presented.  Control groups are formed using 1 to 10 matching (column 1) or 1 to 4 
matching (column 2).  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
      (1)       (2) 
  1 to 10         1 to 4  
 Matching   Matching 
 
Treatment - Control   0.071      0.072  
   (0.015)***    (0.016)***    
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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Table 9 
 
Sample Selection Model: 
Management Fees 
 
Heckman regressions of annual management fees (in percent) on a corporate dummy (equal to 1 for a 
corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  Stage I probit results appear in column 
(1).  Stage II ordinary least squares results appear in column (2).   Robust standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis.   
      (1)    (2)  
Dependent Variable: Corporate Management  
 Dummy   Fees  
Exclusion Restriction:    Size   
Corporate Dummy        0.161     
       
 (0.047)***   
Lambda       -0.030  
       (0.029)  
Size (log)    0.149     
    (0.056)***    
Age (log)   -0.028   0.030  
    (0.076)  (0.007)***   
Family Size (log)    0.910  -0.000  
    (0.149)***  (0.009)  
Load     -0.263   0.070  
    (0.058)***  (0.004)***  
Index Fund Dummy   -0.822  -0.401  
    (0.383)**  (0.033)***  
12-Month Return    0.001  -0.000  
    (0.003)  (0.000)  
Constant   -19.548   0.807  
    (3.627)***  (0.407)**  
Style Controls     Yes  Yes    
Family Controls     Yes  Yes   
Rho       -0.119  
Sigma          0.254  
Observations   3,142   3,142  
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
 
 
